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Why, when, and how do stereotypes change? This paper develops a computational account based on the principles of structure learning: stereotypes are governed by probabilistic beliefs about the assignment of individuals to groups. Two aspects of this account are particularly important. First, groups are flexibly constructed based on the distribution of traits across individuals; groups are not fixed, nor are they assumed to map on to categories we have to provide to the model. This allows the model to explain the phenomena of group discovery and subtyping, whereby deviant individuals are segregated from a group, thus protecting the group’s stereotype. Second, groups are hierarchically structured, such that groups can be nested. This allows the model to explain the phenomenon of subgrouping, whereby a collection of deviant individuals is organized into a refinement of the superordinate group. The structure learning account also sheds light on several factors that determine stereotype change, including perceived group variability, individual typicality, cognitive load, and sample size. 

Abstract Macrostructural characteristics, such as cost of living and state-level anti-poverty programs relate to the magnitude of socioeconomic disparities in brain development and mental health. In this study we leveraged data from the Adolescent Brain and Cognitive Development (ABCD) study from 10,633 9-11 year old youth (5115 female) across 17 states. Lower income was associated with smaller hippocampal volume and higher internalizing psychopathology. These associations were stronger in states with higher cost of living. However, in high cost of living states that provide more generous cash benefits for low-income families, socioeconomic disparities in hippocampal volume were reduced by 34%, such that the association of family income with hippocampal volume resembled that in the lowest cost of living states. We observed similar patterns for internalizing psychopathology. State-level anti-poverty programs and cost of living may be confounded with other factors related to neurodevelopment and mental health. However, the patterns were robust to controls for numerous state-level social, economic, and political characteristics. These findings suggest that state-level macrostructural characteristics, including the generosity of anti-poverty policies, are potentially relevant for addressing the relationship of low income with brain development and mental health. 

What is a group? How do we know to which groups we belong? How do we assign others to groups? A great deal of theorizing across the social sciences, has conceptualized “groups” as synonymous with “categories.” There are significant limitations to this approach, however, particularly for making predictions about novel intergroup contexts and about how intergroup dynamics will change over time. Here I systematize the conditions under which a generalized coalitional psychology gets activated—the recognition of another’s capacity for and likelihood of coordination not only with oneself but with others. First, I synthesize recent developments in research on the cognitive processes that give rise to the inference of coalitions and group-biased preferences (even in the absence of category labels). Then I review downstream consequences of inferences about capacity and likelihood of coordination for valuation, emotions, attribution, and inter-coalitional harm. Finally, I discuss ways to use these psychological levers to attenuate intergroup hostility. 

Social-structure learning is the process by which social groups are identified on the basis of experience. Building on models of structure learning in other domains, we formalize this problem within a Bayesian framework. According to this framework, the probabilistic assignment of individuals to groups is computed by combining information about individuals with prior beliefs about group structure. Experiments with adults and children provide support for this framework, ruling out alternative accounts based on dyadic similarity. More broadly, we highlight the implications of social-structure learning for intergroup cognition, stereotype updating, and coalition formation. 

Humans form social coalitions in every society, yet we know little about how we learn and represent social group boundaries. Here we derive predictions from a computational model of latent structure learning to move beyond explicit category labels and interpersonal, or dyadic similarity as the sole inputs to social group representations. Using a model-based analysis of functional neuroimaging data, we find that separate areas correlate with dyadic similarity and latent structure learning. Trial-by-trial estimates of 'allyship' based on dyadic similarity between participants and each agent recruited medial prefrontal cortex/pregenual anterior cingulate (pgACC). Latent social group structure-based allyship estimates, in contrast, recruited right anterior insula (rAI). Variability in the brain signal from rAI improved prediction of variability in ally-choice behavior, whereas variability from the pgACC did not. These results provide novel insights into the psychological and neural mechanisms by which people learn to distinguish 'us' from 'them'.